So at the very least, it's debatable
Not cut and dried
It's actually incredibly complicated, certainly beyond my understanding and from what I've read, beyond the scope of the average 'legal expert'. The reason is that everybody is automatically defaulting to Maritime law, Solas etc etc. None of these take into account what a State is permitted to do when 'at war' and that's where it get's complicated, it's not something we will resolve on here so I'm not going to get involved in a debate. let's not forget the blockade has been in force sine 2009(?) an despite some countries declaring it illegal, they haven't mounted a legal challenge. I read earlier today hat Spain are looking at the legality so they will probably be the first to challenge it.
Here's why it's so complex:
Mustafa TUNCER, Assistant Professor of International Law at the Naval War College of the Turkish National Defence University.[1] On 9 June 2025, the Israeli Navy boarded and captured the Madleen, a…
internationallaw.blog
Mustafa TUNCER, Assistant Professor of International Law at the Naval War College of the Turkish National Defence University.[1]
On 9 June 2025,
the Israeli Navy boarded and captured the Madleen, a British-flagged activist vessel carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, as part of the enforcement of the naval blockade declared in 2009. This incident, along with the earlier
“unidentified” drone attack in May against the Conscience, a similar activist vessel bound for the Gaza Strip, once again drew international attention to the ongoing Gaza blockade, 15 years after
the attack against the Mavi Marmara, which resulted in the death of 10 civilians on board.
Although the
Mavi Marmara attack triggered broad discussion in international legal scholarship on the legality of the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, the debate did not address the question of whether the Israeli control exercised over this territory constitutes an obstacle to the establishment and enforcement of a naval blockade. This issue has gained importance after 7 October 2023, when
the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched a full-scale operation, including a physical military presence on the blockaded coastline and broader control over the Gaza Strip.
This analysis consists of two main parts. The first examines the
raison d’être of naval blockades, with a particular focus on their relationship with military occupation. The second enquires whether international humanitarian law considers Israel as the Occupying Power in the Gaza Strip, in light of the factual situation since 7 October 2023. Based on the findings in these two parts, this study argues that, among other reasons rendering the Gaza blockade unlawful, Israel cannot maintain its naval blockade, since its status as Occupying Power precludes it from establishing and enforcing such a blockade.
(In)Compatibility Between Military Occupation and Naval Blockade
Regarding the question whether an occupied territory may be subjected to a naval blockade, one of the earliest arguments was put forward by
the Turkish Report on the attack against the Mavi Marmara, which asserted that ‘a State cannot, by definition, blockade the borders of territory it occupies.’ In response,
Longobardo criticised the Turkish Report for not providing ‘a sound argument to support this view’, and argued that the law of blockade and the law of occupation are distinct legal regimes, which could therefore coexist during a naval blockade of an occupied coastline.
Guilfoyle, meanwhile, presented a more ambiguous perspective and highlighted the silence of some expert manuals and national military manuals, particularly the 1994 San Remo Manual, which is regarded in the literature
‘as an authoritative statement of existing law’.
It is true that the rules of the San Remo Manual on naval blockades do not exclude the possibility of a belligerent establishing a blockade of a coastline under its occupation. More importantly, however, they do not suggest that it is permissible either. The silence of the San Remo Manual should be examined in conjunction with other sources to determine whether such a customary rule exists in the law of naval warfare.
The 1909 London Declaration and
the 1913 Oxford Manual, both considered to reflect the customary rules of their time, restricted the geographical scope of naval blockades to ‘ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.’ These historical sources clearly demonstrate that the burden of proof lies with those who argue that the customary rules on blockades have since evolved to permit blockades of occupied territories.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that State practice has extended naval blockades to occupied coastlines. Apart from a few national military manuals that reiterate the silence of the San Remo Manual, several national manuals, such as
the 2006 German Manual (para. 1060),
the 2006 Australian Manual (para. 6.60), and
the 2022 U.S. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (para. 7.7.1), explicitly state that blockades may be imposed only against ‘ports … or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy State’.
Finally,
the 2023 Newport Manual (para. 7.4.1), along with
its second edition of 2025, ‘a purely
lex lata exercise’ prepared by some of the most renowned scholars of the law of naval warfare, confined the scope of a blockade to ‘specified coastal areas that are under the sovereignty, occupation or control of an enemy.’
This position is a direct consequence of the historical evolution and rationale of naval blockades, a method of warfare that emerged as
the maritime equivalent of sieges. The analogy between sieges and blockades is not merely historical but remains relevant today. For example,
the 2022 French Manual (para. 5.5.4), assessed these two methods of warfare under the same category, thereby rendering the establishment of a naval blockade of an occupied coastline impossible. Accordingly, just as an occupied territory cannot be besieged by its Occupying Power, an occupied coastline cannot be blockaded by its Occupying Power, since blockades, by their nature, aim to interrupt maritime navigation to and from a portion of coastline under the control of the adversary.
This does not mean, however, that the Occupying Power cannot implement certain measures at sea to ensure the security of its effective control over the occupied coastline. For example, it may, in exceptional cases, suspend the innocent passage of foreign ships through the occupied territorial sea under
Article 19(2) of UNCLOS, or establish a ‘maritime exclusion zone’ in an area near to the occupied territory (
paragraphs 105-108 of the San Remo Manual). Although such measures may resemble naval blockades in practice, they are based on entirely distinct legal foundations and do not confer the same broad authority to restrict maritime navigation as naval blockades.