Mr Bates and the post office

[DP]

It is far more complicated than that - the system would have been designed by system analysts, possibly working from a brief generated by one or more business analysts. It was then written by computer programmers and then tested by a (separate) testing team. Specialist code, such as comms or security software (as in a distributed system such as this) is often the product of a separate development team, as commercial developers rarely do systems or comms software.

Once the application has been passed by the software house team it should be tested by a separate team at the client, who in larger systems also use computer auditors to validate the results generated by the system. Even after that you'd normally have a live test pilot run with (hopefully) a manual audit to confirm results.

At all stages bugs are noted and passed back to the development team to be corrected. But the decisions sbout what gets fixed is ultimately down to nanagement, not developers. So just who do you prosecute?

More of concern was a tiny clip supposedly set at Fujitsu in Bracknell, in their "operations centre", where an operator seems to have been telling someone that they could modify transactions to correct computer errors! In any secure system this should be simply impossible to do. If the comms is corrupting records then the software needs to be amended in such a way that this becomes either impossible or at worst exceptionally rare. The error log which was produced later in the program I watched would seemto imply that comms errors were occurring far too frequentently. IMHO that is where the real IT issue lies. Who permitted these operations centre staff to make such changes? What was done to ensure that these errors were trapped and corrected? So not quite a development or testing issue - more a management issue, surely?

As to a "foreign company", hardly. Fukitsu was originally called ICL (International Computers Ltd) and were very British. Their software is allegedly still developed here, but they hardly fill me with confidence given how much of a bunch of jobsworths they at one time were (and still are according to.one acquaintance who is in IT management). My missus worked for them for a while; I worked with them on several projects in the past - which tends to bias us both somewhat

.

Computer does not make mistakes. Errors are human. Sh17 in Sh17 out. Computer just crunches what is input

 

[blup]

The senior PO management say there are no significant discussions on their whatsapp group, so they have not disclosed even to their own lawyers. Immediate alarm bells should ring. As David ZDavis says if their lawyers cant get the documents the inquiry should get new ones to do it.

 

[blup]

Computer does not make mistakes. Errors are human. Sh17 in Sh17 out. Computer just crunches what is input

One of the bugs was no more than the user screen freezing, so duplicate transactions totted up as the spm repeatedly tapped the screen to get it to accept the input, in one case in front of a PO and fukitso rep, who maintained total denial the system could do that, then quietly - and remotely - corrected it.

 

[Brigadier]

If however, the cover-up began from the very top of the corporate hierarchy then the company itself has to shoulder the responsibility for this terrible injustice. The buck stops there, right

Wrong.

You've named five individuals who bear responsibility, in the paragraphs immediately before your statement above.

Investigate them.

If they've done wrong, punish them.




You've still not answered my question - asked twice now - about whether you were accountable for your actions and decisions when employed by a company, or you hid behind "the company".

Big boy pants, or sloping shoulders?

 

[Odds]

 

[Brigadier]

You've still not answered my question - asked twice now - about whether you were accountable for your actions and decisions when employed by a company, or you hid behind "the company".

Big boy pants, or sloping shoulders?

Three times asked........

 

[Odds]

Three times asked........

I've already told you i did not work for the Post Office.
Hard of hearing?
Try to stay on topic.

 

[Brigadier]

I've already told you i did not work for the Post Office.
Hard of hearing?
Try to stay on topic.

I already told you that I know, because you told me.

#276 refers.
Are you hard of comprehension?

Asking whether you accepted any personal liability, or hid behind "the company", IS staying on topic, as you're basing your position on the corporation / company / organisation being held accountable.

Which I'm saying is wrong, as it's PEOPLE who make the decisions, take action, and act on the results (of things such as computer outputs).

Inanimate bodies do no such things:there is always, ultimately, human oversight.

 

[Justin Passing]

It is far more complicated than that - the system would have been designed by system analysts, possibly working from a brief generated by one or more business analysts. It was then written by computer programmers and then tested by a (separate) testing team. Specialist code, such as comms or security software (as in a distributed system such as this) is often the product of a separate development team, as commercial developers rarely do systems or comms software.

Once the application has been passed by the software house team it should be tested by a separate team at the client, who in larger systems also use computer auditors to validate the results generated by the system. Even after that you'd normally have a live test pilot run with (hopefully) a manual audit to confirm results.

At all stages bugs are noted and passed back to the development team to be corrected. But the decisions sbout what gets fixed is ultimately down to nanagement, not developers. So just who do you prosecute?

More of concern was a tiny clip supposedly set at Fujitsu in Bracknell, in their "operations centre", where an operator seems to have been telling someone that they could modify transactions to correct computer errors! In any secure system this should be simply impossible to do. If the comms is corrupting records then the software needs to be amended in such a way that this becomes either impossible or at worst exceptionally rare. The error log which was produced later in the program I watched would seemto imply that comms errors were occurring far too frequentently. IMHO that is where the real IT issue lies. Who permitted these operations centre staff to make such changes? What was done to ensure that these errors were trapped and corrected? So not quite a development or testing issue - more a management issue, surely?

As to a "foreign company", hardly. Fukitsu was originally called ICL (International Computers Ltd) and were very British. Their software is allegedly still developed here, but they hardly fill me with confidence given how much of a bunch of jobsworths they at one time were (and still are according to.one acquaintance who is in IT management). My missus worked for them for a while; I worked with them on several projects in the past - which tends to bias us both somewhat

.

Systems analysts do not specify the overarching system requirements.
Neither do business analysts.
Both are functionaries, implementing the requrements from the boss, who should defer to whatever legislative structure applies.

Something like the question of whether the postmaster's figures could be changed without their knowledge, is higher that either of those operatives can decide.
This abortion was something done to the users. It wasn't transparent, and it wasn't consentual.
There are multiple standards for systems and software from ISO and others, which say you must to justify every decision you take so others can go back and see why you did things the way you did, and how the criterion is satisfied, inter alia. ISO 9000/1, 25010 and others I can't remember. At every level, it's the company's responsibility to make sure such standards are complied with. Many "programmers" and "project leaders" haven't a clue how to do it. It was reported that there were very few capable, in place.

In comparison with Grenfell; in that case, the appropriate Building Regulations should have been consulted, and the BR should have protected the occupants, and the builders should have complied with the BR.
As far as I've heard there wasn't an equivalent in the PO, so the PO were able to do whatever the hell they liked, and then prosecute, ffs.
The PO were responsible for the suitability of the software and systems they used.

Systems auditors should have checked the system was doing what the bosses wanted, not what the business analysts or programmers wanted.
That's the regulatory framework you have in a bank - this is similar enough, which anyone should have seen.

WHO gave the PO that authority without checking they were competent and accountable?
Maybe there is no such legislative reequirement, but to not see, and/or to take antagonising action when questions arose, was in my view criminal and prisonworthy.

 

[ETAF]

i'm surprised they PO/Auditors did not seem to be able reconcile the losses , as far as i understand ALL the loses that had been paid back, went straight to the bottom line as profit , so noloss found

 

[motorbiking]

In the old days of mainframes etc, a systems analyst would do the job now known as a Solution Architect. On a project of this scale there would be Design Authorities and armies of technical architects (non-functional) and solution architects (functional). Computer programmers were known as developers. It's all down to the fact that since the mid-90s ERP boom, business software rarely involved writing a program from scratch.

@ETAF - The Irony that to do so, is false accounting, something the PO prosecuted the SPMs for. You cannot recognise money in a bank account as revenue, unless you can associate it to a business transaction that you can recognise (obligations delivered).

@Odds Corporations do of course have rights, powers liability etc. Some examples:
Corporate manslaughter
owning intelectual property
obligations not to be corrupt.
etc

 

[Odds]

...so the PO were able to do whatever the hell they liked, and then prosecute, ffs.
The PO were responsible for the suitability of the software and systems they used.

Systems auditors should have checked the system was doing what the bosses wanted, not what the business analysts or programmers wanted.
That's the regulatory framework you have in a bank - this is similar enough, which anyone should have seen.

WHO gave the PO that authority without checking they were competent and accountable?
Maybe there is no such legislative reequirement, but to not see, and/or to take antagonising action when questions arose, was in my view criminal and prisonworthy.

Corporations do of course have rights, powers liability etc. Some examples: obligations not to be corrupt.
etc

Isn't this a case of corruption within the higest levels of management at the Post Office?
Knowing the system was at fault and carrying out further prosecutions regardless of that knowledge?
Horizon is rightly being dragged over the coals for their compliscent attitude in the coverup but the Post Office has a duty of care to its employees and customers that was blatantly ignored over a long period of time.

 

[motorbiking]

It was only lightly touched on, in the TV series, but the contracts the SMPs have seem to be a hybrid "relational contract" of employee and supplier.

On the one hand, they could be sacked like an employee, on the other they could be held personally accountable like a supplier. I haven't yet got round to reading what the trial (no,3) had to say about the contractual position - its several dozen pages. It's interesting that the contractual terms were not sent to new SPM until after they had started working. This was apparently a deliberate policy. From a skim read on the issues with the contracts - The term dodgy b*** springs to mind. 100s of unfair terms litter the contracts.

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/bates-v-post-office-judgment-no3-15-mar-19.pdf

 

[Brigadier]

And, it gets worse for "the Post Office"....

HMRC reckon they've avoided tax, to the tune of £100 million, by deducting compensation payments - to Horizon scandal victims - and declaring lower profits.

While that may be illegal in itself, it is compounded by them failing to include those same payments when calculating the profits on which executives' pay (and bonuses) were calculated.


(source: BBC News website)

....

 

[carmanmemoranda]

I hope the Post Office, and the responsible people who dictated the policies are brought to real justice.

But I'm not holding my breath