Pilot light on Glow Work Fuelsaver Mk2 wont stay on

[PEDANTICVINDICTIVEMAN]

Thanks, I dont want any advice on how its fixed as i know nothing about gas and certainly dont want to mess with it. Do the rules prohibit you telling me the name of the part? My main concern is getting a plumber and they tell me its something else and charge me the earth would rather show i at least had an idea with them.

I assume i caused this with trying to balance the radiators?

I think the name of the faulty part is boiler, are you old and vunerable, as I could pop round and overcharge and maybe pee in your tank in the loft for good measure..

 

[ChrisRH]

Many thanks to all the helpful people who have replied..........but my God you have some total dicks who reply too.

 

[bernardgreen]

Bernard! What circuitry.!

Can you hear the Google servers creaking under the strain . Perhaps he'll just ignore these questions like he did the cooker thread.

Here be notes made during a conversation with an aquaintance who for many years investigated insurance claims. A personal interest in the history of domestic appliances has given him a solid knowledge about gas and electrical appliances.

The first gas heating appliances were dangerous. Lighting them meant holding a naked flame into the combustion area and then turning on the gas tap. If the naked flame was put into the combustion area after the gas tap had been turned on then an accumulation of gas and air would be ignited. The results varied from a mild whoosh of flame to a mini explosion. Burnt hands and faces were a real hazard of the task. Another hazard was if the flames were blown out then gas continued to flow until someone smelt gas and turned off the gas tap. Attempting to relight the appliance could result in a room full of gas exploding.
To reduce the risk of face burning whooshes when lighting the gas the concept of the pilot flame was introduced. A small gas flame in the combustion area would be lit before turning on the main gas tap. This resulted in large reductions in the number of injuries and insurance claims.
It was soon apparent that pilot flames were being left burning continuously to avoid the need to light them each time the appliance was used. Turning on the main gas tap without the pilot flame burning would allow large amounts of gas to flow out of the appliance.
It required the person lighting the appliance to check that the pilot flame was alight before turning on the main gas tap. It also created the hazard that gas for the pilot flame would continue to flow out of the appliance if the flame was blown out.
Insurance companies were paying out on claims. They pressed for appliances to be made less dangerous.
The automatic safety gas valve was necessary. It had to prevent the main gas valve being turned on if there was no pilot flame and it had to close the pilot gas valve if the flame went out.

The humble thermo couple and a simple electro-magnet provided the answer. To light the pilot flame a button would be pressed and held to open the pilot gas valve while the pilot flame was lit. The pilot flame would heat the thermo couple and the electrical power thus generated would energise an electro-magnet to take over holding the pilot gas valve open. The button could then be released. If the pilot flame failed to keep the thermo couple hot then the electro magnet would lose its power and release the pilot gas valve which then under spring pressure would close and shut of the gas to the pilot flame.

A main gas valve was included and interlocked to the pilot gas valve in such a way that if the pilot gas valve was closed then the main gas valve could not open.
Except for faults in the delicate mechanics of the gas valve assembly this was a fail safe device and it's introduction in various forms to gas appliances reduced the hazards of gas.

Then came the automatic control of appliances where they would turn on under command of a timers and not by the actions of a person present by the appliance.

Aautomatic requests from timers or thermostats for the main gas valve to open did not create any hazard since the main gas valve could not open If there was no pilot flame . If the appliance did not fire up due to the pilot flame having gone out then human intervention to re-light the pilot flame was needed.

This safe state of affairs was disrupted when energy saving required that pilot flames were not left permanently alight but were only lit when it was necessary to light the main burners.

A control unit would be required to be built into the appliance. This control unit would have to perform the same actions that a person would perform when lighting a pilot flame.

The sequence of turning on the pilot gas valve, creating a spark to ignite the pilot flame and continue sparking until there was confirmation of the pilot flame being lit. The sequence had also to be time limited and if the pilot flame did not ignite in that time then some fault indication or process should occur.

At the end of the sequence the control unit does not know if the pilot flame is burning. It may assume it is burning and attempt to turn on the main gas valve by energising another solenoid to open the main gas valve. The automatic safety gas valve will prevent the main gas valve being opened if the thermo couple is cold. Safety is assured by the fail safe thermo couple and electro magnet system preventing gas flow when not ignited..

Failure to inite the pilot flame would go un-detected until failure of the appliance to provide heating was noticed.

It was necessary to find a way to detect the presence of a pilot flame in the combustion area and no longer rely on a person noticing there was a fault..
The simplest method was to measure the voltage from the thermo couple and assume that if there was a flame heating the thermo couple then the main burner would also ignite when the main gas valve was opened.

Provided the circuit used to measure the voltage from the thermo-couple was very high impedance and thus un-able, under any condition, normal or fault, to supply enough energy for the electro-magnet to hold the pilot gas valve open this method of flame detection was considered to be safe in that it did not prevent the automatic safety gas valve from cutting off the gas if there was a flame out.

It is not clear why this simple approach was not widely adopted.

Under sized pilot flames able to heat the thermo couple but unable to ignite main burners had been seen in some appliances, this creates a hazard of gas escapes which the automatic safety gas valve cannot prevent. The risk of the pilot flame not being able to ignite the main burners while heating the thermo couple is minimised by the design of the pilot flame nozzle(s).

Various methods of flame detection have been used, ionisation being one of the common methods. Measuring the temperature of flue gases leaving the combustion area was seen as a method to provide both flame detection and over heat conditions with a single sensor.

Commercial heating appliances used the colour sensors to both detect if there was a flame and whether the combustion was efficient and safe.

Blue flames are burning gas efficiently and safely, white or yellow flames are not burning gas properly due to lack of adequate air and will produce high levels of carbon monoxide
The automatic safety gas valve was and still is the basic safety item. Instead of a person pressing and holding a button to open the pilot gas valve a solenoid in the automatic safety gas valve is controlled by the control unit and holds the pilot gas valve open while a spark generator attempts to ignite the pilot flame. When the thermocouple is hot the electro magnet in the automatic safety gas valve holds the pilot gas valve open after the control unit has de-energised the solenoid. If the pilot flame is not burning when the solenoid is de-enrgised then the pilot gas valve will be close.

The control unit has no indication as to whether the main burners have ignited. The one hazard the automatic safety gas valve could not prevent was failure of a plot flame to ignite the main burners while still able to heat the thermo couple.

He also made the comment based on his many years of investigating domestic insurance claims that a Gas Safe Registered Installer is just that an installer

To be a competent fault finder and repairer requires the person to have been given training in the appliance he is called to diagnose. A few people may be able to apply generic knowledge and be competent in fault finding in an appliance for which they have not been specifically trained.

 

[45yearsagasman]

.but my God you have some total dicks who reply too.

There you go. I wonder to whom this refers?

 

[Steelmasons]

Hey Bernard , are you suggesting the flame on a forced draught burner should burn blue?????..I must have been doing it wrong all these years..
A blue flame on a forced draught would send CO through the roof along with FGA having a fit....

BTW..."a room full of gas" would not "explode"
It seems your "aquaintance" should stick to insurance and leave gas appliances to the professionals , a truly unprofessional set of "notes".

 

[bernardgreen]

ey Bernard , are you suggesting the flame on a forced draught burner should burn blue?????..I must have been doing it wrong all these years..
A blue flame on a forced draught would send CO through the roof along with FGA having a fit....

The conversation was based on the history of appliances and the development of safety systems in them

 

[Dan Robinson]

The conversation and that boolox you posted was time you'll never get back mate. Give it up before we have to get you a hoist to lift you put off the hole you've been digging.

 

[Dan Robinson]

BTW..."a room full of gas" would not "explode"

Nor half a room. Or even a third.

 

[bernardgreen]

BTW..."a room full of gas" would not "explode"

It would need to have air mixed with it in the correct ratio to create a combustion rate high enough to create explosive forces on the fabric of the containment ( walls floor and ceiling of the room )

Nor half a room. Or even a third.

Come on Dan, tell us what is the ratio and volume that would result in this devastion ( in York ) That is assuming it was a gas explosion and not some other chemical reaction.

Was it a result of DIY gas work ?

 

[Aquaheat]

Come on Dan, tell us what is the ratio and volume that would result in this devastion ( in York ) That is assuming it was a gas explosion and not some other chemical reaction.

All competent RGI's will know that ratio. Volume has nothing to do with gas levels falling/rising into the explosive range.

Also just having the correct mixture of gas and air doesn't create an explosion.

As for your picture all it shows is that that particular explosion was bigger than others but also smaller than a lot of others.

Jon

 

[Dan Robinson]

It's also a rather poor attempt to avoid previous questions

What gas was it @bernardgreen?

 

[Aquaheat]

What gas was it @bernardgreen?

Gas is gas Dan it just goes bang whatever surely?

Hey Bernard , are you suggesting the flame on a forced draught burner should burn blue?????..I must have been doing it wrong all these years..
A blue flame on a forced draught would send CO through the roof along with FGA having a fit....

I'm going to contact Nu-Way, Weishaupt (sp?), Riello etc etc as they have been doing it wrong all this time and they need to know.

If you could give me your details bernard I'll pass them on to the manus so their R+D departments can get the real information.

I'm a bit gutted now as I've set up hundreds of burners incorrectly now.

Jon

 

[Dan Robinson]

Pooh. Wish I'd read this thread an hour ago. Just set up a burner. Must have totally screwed it up. I thought the coefficient of discharge (@Gaswizard ) was messed up and flipped the injector disc over.

Apparently it was fine after all.


Hey ho. Must be off. Have to buy some bails of hay for Dobbin.