Who knows their way round Building Regs? (fire)

[JohnD]

In a late attempt at government arse-covering, it is reported by the BBC that

"12:31

Now comes a statement from the Department for Communities and Local Government:

"Cladding using a composite aluminium panel with a polyethylene core would be non-compliant with current Building Regulations guidance.

"This material should not be used as cladding on buildings over 18m in height.

"We cannot comment on what type of cladding was used on the building - this will be subject to investigations."

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-england-london-40239008

Curiously, I do not find this statement at the Department for Communities and Local Government

https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements?keywords=cladding&announcement_filter_option=all&topics[]=all&departments[]=department-for-communities-and-local-government&world_locations[]=all&from_date=15/6/17&to_date=

Does anyone know where the text appears that they refer to?

What is the significance of the word "should" rather than "must?"

 

[John D v2.0]

I reat the same post, and was wondering which guidance they were referring to. I think "should" refers to the fact that it's from the guidance (ADs?), and the building regs (legislation) themselves don't specify much. If they did, then it would be a "must" rather than "should"

 

[Newboy]

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Sandwich_panel

http://www.bre.co.uk/filelibrary/rpts/sandwich/ABIsandwichPanels.pdf

 

[Newboy]

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire

 

[tony1851]

Thing is, the Approved Docs. are only guidance, not the law.
The law on fire spread is regulation B4(1) of the Building Regulations which clearly states;

'The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls......etc' (note "shall").

Going a little off topic - there's a lot of nonsense about this matter being spouted by the media and also the locals
eg - the residents claim there were no fire alarms; normal practice is not to have communal alarms because
a fire usually only occurs in one flat, and is contained by the fire-resisting construction, and fire doors. Panic could ensue if everyone used the stairs at once.

Another issue concerns the escape stairs. These are always a place of safety, protected in a fire resisting enclosure.
Could the fire doors to the stairs have been propped open for convenience? - otherwise why did so many on the top floors not escape?
Obviously individual flats caught fire, but fires within the flats should have been contained, and certainly kept away from the stairs.

It's seems fairly certain that cavity barriers were omitted or ineffective around windows when they fitted the rain screen cladding, but even with materials which were not wholly non-combustible, a fire should not have entered the flats as it did.

Quite possibly this is not as clear cut as seems at first glance, and the problem might have been exacerbated by the way the residents used the building - hopefully all this will come out in the enquiry.

 

[John D v2.0]

Terrible tragedy.

Quite possibly this is not as clear cut as seems at first glance, and the problem might have been exacerbated by the way the residents used the building - hopefully all this will come out in the enquiry.

Excellent post, i notice you're sensibly being careful with how you talk about how the residents use the building, I used to live in a block close to there in an adjoining borough, and regular inspections meant there was no chance to use the buildings in a way contrary to safety, any rubbish left in the corridor disappeared within days and all fire doors maintained and almost never propped open. There was a full time warden making sure everything was in order.
Seems in grenfell block, residents were complaining about rubbish blocking escapes for a while before hand.
They should only build a building that relies on certain tenant behaviour if they will enforce that behaviour strictly.

 

[Newboy]

any rubbish left in the corridor disappeared within days and all fire doors maintained and almost never propped open.

Which is exactly the problem - nobody knows when the fire is going to start.

 

[John D v2.0]

Which is exactly the problem - nobody knows when the fire is going to start.

True but statistically in a big block of 120 flats chances are there will be a fire every 10 years or so. So the setup needs to assume there will be one and manage things accordingly.

 

[Newboy]

Inevitably the appalling event (Grenfell) will have occurred as a result of a number of factors - construction, condition, usage, time of day and human behaviour.

The last factor being the hardest to plan for.

Last week, as part of an unrelated call out to student accommodation, I found cigarette ends in one room stubbed out in a paper cup. In the same room the smoke detector (wireless interlinked) was missing - it was found in the occupier's chest of drawers because "it kept going off".

 

[JohnD]

strangely, Chancellor Hammond seems to have a special copy of the Building Regulations that cover the whole of the UK, in which this cladding is banned.

Why has nobody else seen a copy?

The media are reporting his rumour as if it was true.

"Chancellor Philip Hammond has said that the controversial non-fire resistant cladding fitted to Grenfell Tower was in fact banned in the UK."

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...in-uk-philip-hammond-germany-us-a7795696.html

 

[John D v2.0]

Well, it's his understanding, so you never know how he thought that up. Maybe he just googled it.

I'd expect whether it meets building regs would be commented on by the public enquiry, along with whether the building regs and their guidance/enforcement are fit for purpose.

 

[tony1851]

In most aspects of building, the Building Regulations set performance standards, rather than giving prescriptive rules/materials etc. as they used to do in the old days.
The Approved Documents accompanying the Regulations are only guidance issued by DCLG - they are not the law on building standards. They are intended to help specifiers comply with the law.
In the case of Grenfel, the law is quite specific in that it does not allow unrestricted flame spread over the wall of a building.
This morning, a journalist writing in the Graun fell into the trap of assuming the guidance on fire (A.D. Part B) was the law, which it ain't.
The regs themselves are fine, it's the guidance which can be suspect.

 

[JohnD]

Where is the ban?

 

[Newboy]

There will not be a banned list of materials.

There is a specified performance which materials must meet

"The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building."

 

[^woody^]

The requirements are quite simple. The cladding material should "adequately resist the spread of fire". This goes not only for the cladding material and system, but for fire stopping of any cavity between the structure and the cladding. Low combustibility is preferred, but the requirement does not go as far as noncombustible.

There is no requirement for the cladding to be fire proof, but should perform when tested to limit fire spread. IIRC, there was a significant flat fire in the early 90's where fire spread externally. Following the investigation, the way external fire tests were carried out was changed.

Annual risk assessments under the Regulatory Reform Fire Safety Order should assess the suitability of external cladding.