High Rise Fire

[securespark]

Shocking.

Why did the fire spread so ferociously?

Did the newly fitted external cladding propagate fire?

http://www.rydon.co.uk/what-we-do/r...ies/refurbishment-case-studies/grenfell-tower

Were the fire doors ineffective?

Was the LA negligent in their advice to residents (Close doors, use wet towels, that will give you an hour by which time the brigade will be attending)?

Was the gas supply a contributory factor?

Did a certain brand of refrigeration appliance start the fire?

Were coroner's recommendations, drawn up after a similar fire, ever implemented?

The owner of Grenfell Tower placed its fire safety policy under review last year and ordered multiple changes to the way it handled fire risk in its properties, including speeding up the installation of self-closing doors, tackling hoarding and dealing with clutter in communal areas that posed a fire risk. Were these implemented?

The residents of Grenfell Tower had raised fire safety concerns four years prior to the tower block fire:

In February 2013 Grenfell Action Group warned fire safety equipment had not been tested for 12 months.

The residents group published an extract from a 2012 fire risk assessment which found that fire extinguishers in the basement boiler room, lift motor room and ground floor electrical room were more than 12 months out of test date.

Others located in roof level areas had "condemned" written on them in large black writing and had not been tested since 2009.

 

[tomfe]

Eps Ewi is a known fire risk, not only because it is flammable but it also creates a chimney effect, for multistorey fire brakes have to be used. It does look like the façade was on fire.

 

[tony1851]

As tomfe suggests, regardless of how the fire started, the fact that it spread so quickly suggests that the new (sluminium) cladding (and possibly EWI) caused the fire to spread across the facade. Poor installation/workmanship or poor design? Who knows?

 

[JohnD]

I'm trying not to make up my mind until after the investigation, but it looked to me like the insulation was afire. The cladding would have protected it from the fire hoses. If the cladding was aluminium, I imagine holes would have burned through it to give a good draught.

If the outside of the building was burning, internal fire doors and extinguishers will have been pretty irrelevant. An internal protected escape shaft might have helped.

I find the suffering and deaths too horrible to contemplate. A person's home should be their safe refuge.

I have a feeling some heads will roll, and some regulations change.

I remember seeing foamed glass slab insulation used in US, it was heavily promoted as waterproof and non-flammable, and looked as easily installed as Celotex.

edit

it looks like there was a protected shaft. I hope some people were able to get out

 

[Brigadier]

I woke at 0200 this morning, and heard events unfold on r5l.
Truly heartbreaking, as it seemed evident that people were trapped on upper floors and, with the fire wrapping the exterior, they had little to no chance of getting out or being rescued. And "we" were powerless to do anything about it.

 

[tony1851]

A thing which puzzles me is this;

without pre-judging the issue, it looks as though the EWI and cladding played a part in the rapid spread across the facade.
If there were no/inadequate cavity barriers around the windows, fire will of course start in each flat. But each flat should have fire doors opening onto the flats' own hallway, and the entrance door to each flat should also be a fire door. JohnDs plan above also shows the usual doors opening onto the staircase enclosure. Theoretically, the staircase enclosure should then be a place of safety.

So why were people trapped in their flats? Did perhaps smoke fill the staircase enclosure, possibly by some residents propping open the lobby fire doors?

 

[JohnD]

when I was a keen skier, I used to jog up and down the stairs of my office block to the 14th floor twice a day.

I am sure older people, those with small children or bad legs, would have found it quite a lot harder.

 

[IWalkLikeHimaMartian]

when I was a keen skier, I used to jog up and down the stairs of my office block to the 14th floor twice a day.

I am sure older people, those with small children or bad legs, would have found it quite a lot harder.

There were some tenants that could not walk. How were they supposed to escape in case of fire?
It is contrary to common sense to house tenants that cannot walk in high rise blocks.

 

[Brigadier]

There were some tenants that could not walk. How were they supposed to escape in case of fire?
It is contrary to common sense to house tenants that cannot walk in high rise blocks.

I was listening to a documentary about the future recently.
One of the predictions was that we'd be living in 30km-tall buildings by 2050.
I suppose at least we'd have a chance of the parachute opening, because I would struggle to think of another practical way out, in case of something like Grenfell...

 

[IWalkLikeHimaMartian]

I suppose at least we'd have a chance of the parachute opening, because I would struggle to think of another practical way out, in case of something like Grenfell...

Zip line, rubble chute type escape (already in use on oil rigs)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escape_chute

 

[transam]

Bloke on the radio said that in the USA all high rise fire alarm systems also have to have a voice communication ability

as well as a siren ,the residents can be instructed verbally

This stay put policy they are on about . how would any resident adhering to it know if the stay put scenario had changed mid fire ,unless someone comes to there door

Hence the US fire alarm version .

 

[333rocky333]

http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ect/&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&hl=en-gb&client=safari

https://web.archive.org/web/20170614034527/harleyfacades.co.uk/page/grenfell-tower

 

[transam]

http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ect/&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&hl=en-gb&client=safari

trouble is that it seems the fire spread up the out side of the building .

plus the fire brigade cannot get water under pressure beyond the 12th floor (I think they said ?)

 

[IWalkLikeHimaMartian]

If the outside of the building was burning, internal fire doors and extinguishers will have been pretty irrelevant. An internal protected escape shaft might have helped....
it looks like there was a protected shaft.

It is a bit pointless to rely on the principle of restricting the spread of fire internally, if you then go and clad the building outside with combustible material. You are, in effect, bridging the fire breaks.
Similar principle to providing DPM, then bridging that DPM.

 

[Mikefromlondon]

They spent 10million on refurb last year, that worked out at £85,000 for each of the 120 flats, sounds a lot of money for a refurb, and when you think how it ended up in a complete disaster.. I am sure there will be hundreds of lessons we would be learning and we will have to meet new rules, such as sprinklers, smoke extraction, proper fire alarms linked to a central control panel and remotely monitored by security companies.

One of the things they said about a sudden evacuation of 600 people if the alarms had gone off would have caused other stampede problems. two lifts for 120 flats is simply not even enough. for a 24 story block!

So if the cause if this rapid fire spreading was due to insulating cladding, presumably to save on heating cost, or loss of heat, it would have been cheaper in the long run to have spend that money on subsidising residents with extra cost of heating . This is a clear proof of experts getting it wrong. If these materials have been approved by LA, they will have a lot to answer, possibly they could now be directly responsible for the loss of lives, blood is now on their hands!