What is the best Brexit deal we can realistically achieve?
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"This is the second part of this post. The first part was published here and the third part is now here.
The preparation begins
After the referendum result came in, the EU’s leaders were quick to articulate how they believed Brexit should be dealt with. Announcing principles and objectives are one thing, mastery of process another. But in this respect, the EU also moved swiftly.
While those in the UK obsessed about the first two sentences of Article 50, those on the EU side focused on the following sentences:
“In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”
Article 218(3) in turn provides (as far as is relevant):
“The Commission … shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team.”
Article 218 goes on to provide:
“4. The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.
5. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorising the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force.
6. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the agreement.”
In essence, the EU had to set up a number of hoops. They can be summarised as follows:
This process is set out at treaty level and, for those who take EU and its law seriously, it is the highest form of prescribed process. Within days of the referendum result, Donald Tusk, president of the council, and others were thinking through the process as a whole. The next stages were to start on the guidelines and identify a negotiator (and put together a negotiating team).
The guidelines — to be adopted at the end of this week — thus became the central document of Brexit. The appointed negotiator could only negotiate within their parameters. Once the guidelines were adopted they — and not any selfish influences exerted on the negotiating team by a member state or industry lobby — would determine the shape of Brexit. The only directives and supervision would come from a committee of the council.
The European Parliament’s effective veto also meant there was likely to be a further check on what would ultimately be approved. The negotiator was thereby to operate within two sets of limits, one from each of the two bodies whose approval was required.
So, from about July 2016 (if not before), those on the EU side concentrated on what these key documents would say. All this was openly stated — yet when the European Parliament recently put forward its draft resolution, and the European Council circulated its draft guidelines, there seemed surprise in the UK that the documents even existed. But they are as much a part of the Article 50 process as the notification letter itself.
In addition to the guidelines, there needed to be a negotiating team. The negotiator would have limited scope. He or she would be the servant of the European institutions, able only to work within the parameters of what the European Council would allow and (indirectly) what the European Parliament would approve. Nonetheless, it was essential to get this appointment right and to get the best team in place quickly.
As early as 27 July 2016, Jean-Claude Juncker (president of the European Commission) identified Michel Barnier, former vice-president of the commission and French foreign minister, for the job. Mr Barnier was duly appointed by the European Council “chief negotiator” to lead a task force preparing for the UK leaving under Article 50.
By 14 September, the shape of the task force (“TF50″ as it became known) was announced, and the vastly experienced trade official Sabine Weyand was appointed as Mr Barnier’s deputy. Mr Juncker is quoted at this point as saying:
“This new Task Force will be composed of the Commission’s best and brightest. They will help Michel Barnier to conduct the negotiations with the United Kingdom effectively, benefiting from the deep knowledge and rich experience available across the whole Commission.”
There was substance to this boast: TF50 was quickly pulling together an experienced and capable team. Mr Barnier’s appointment took effect on 1 October and TF50 was moving quickly to develop its approach to the negotiations by the end of the year. Mr Barnier himself commenced a tour of all the EU27 member states to ensure each was on board and to ascertain what would be acceptable in the guidelines.
On 8 September, Mr Tusk visited Theresa May in London, just before the next meeting of the EU27 at Bratislava. His remarks were stark:
“My intention is to tell you about the agenda of the Bratislava meeting of 27 leaders next week. We decided to organise this informal meeting to discuss and to assess the political consequences of Brexit for the EU community. This doesn’t mean that we are going to discuss our future relations with the UK in Bratislava. For this, and especially for the start of the negotiations, we need your formal notification, I mean Article 50. And this is the position shared by all 27 Member States.
“To put it simply, the ball is now in your court. I am aware that it is not easy, but I still hope you will be ready to start the process as soon as possible. But I am convinced that at the end of the day our common strategy goal will be to establish the best possible relations between the UK and the European Union.”
The position was already well settled: there was unity, and there would be no negotiation without notification. In the background, the European Commission and the European Council were in advanced preparation for the next stage of the Article 50 process. Even the European Parliament, on 8 September, had appointed Guy Verhofstadt as a representative and co-ordinator for the Article 50 process.
The EU stance in terms of both substance and process was solidifying: the train and the track were almost in place. And this was a month before Mrs May’s speech to the Conservative party conference in Birmingham in October.
The preparation begins
After the referendum result came in, the EU’s leaders were quick to articulate how they believed Brexit should be dealt with. Announcing principles and objectives are one thing, mastery of process another. But in this respect, the EU also moved swiftly.
While those in the UK obsessed about the first two sentences of Article 50, those on the EU side focused on the following sentences:
“In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”
Article 218(3) in turn provides (as far as is relevant):
“The Commission … shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team.”
Article 218 goes on to provide:
“4. The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.
5. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorising the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force.
6. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the agreement.”
In essence, the EU had to set up a number of hoops. They can be summarised as follows:
- negotiation guidelines are adopted by the European Council;
- the commission will recommend opening negotiations to the council of ministers and the latter will both authorise the opening of those negotiations and nominate the negotiator;
- the council will guide the negotiator through directives and through a special committee;
- the negotiator will propose when the agreement shall be concluded.
This process is set out at treaty level and, for those who take EU and its law seriously, it is the highest form of prescribed process. Within days of the referendum result, Donald Tusk, president of the council, and others were thinking through the process as a whole. The next stages were to start on the guidelines and identify a negotiator (and put together a negotiating team).
The guidelines — to be adopted at the end of this week — thus became the central document of Brexit. The appointed negotiator could only negotiate within their parameters. Once the guidelines were adopted they — and not any selfish influences exerted on the negotiating team by a member state or industry lobby — would determine the shape of Brexit. The only directives and supervision would come from a committee of the council.
The European Parliament’s effective veto also meant there was likely to be a further check on what would ultimately be approved. The negotiator was thereby to operate within two sets of limits, one from each of the two bodies whose approval was required.
So, from about July 2016 (if not before), those on the EU side concentrated on what these key documents would say. All this was openly stated — yet when the European Parliament recently put forward its draft resolution, and the European Council circulated its draft guidelines, there seemed surprise in the UK that the documents even existed. But they are as much a part of the Article 50 process as the notification letter itself.
In addition to the guidelines, there needed to be a negotiating team. The negotiator would have limited scope. He or she would be the servant of the European institutions, able only to work within the parameters of what the European Council would allow and (indirectly) what the European Parliament would approve. Nonetheless, it was essential to get this appointment right and to get the best team in place quickly.
As early as 27 July 2016, Jean-Claude Juncker (president of the European Commission) identified Michel Barnier, former vice-president of the commission and French foreign minister, for the job. Mr Barnier was duly appointed by the European Council “chief negotiator” to lead a task force preparing for the UK leaving under Article 50.
By 14 September, the shape of the task force (“TF50″ as it became known) was announced, and the vastly experienced trade official Sabine Weyand was appointed as Mr Barnier’s deputy. Mr Juncker is quoted at this point as saying:
“This new Task Force will be composed of the Commission’s best and brightest. They will help Michel Barnier to conduct the negotiations with the United Kingdom effectively, benefiting from the deep knowledge and rich experience available across the whole Commission.”
There was substance to this boast: TF50 was quickly pulling together an experienced and capable team. Mr Barnier’s appointment took effect on 1 October and TF50 was moving quickly to develop its approach to the negotiations by the end of the year. Mr Barnier himself commenced a tour of all the EU27 member states to ensure each was on board and to ascertain what would be acceptable in the guidelines.
On 8 September, Mr Tusk visited Theresa May in London, just before the next meeting of the EU27 at Bratislava. His remarks were stark:
“My intention is to tell you about the agenda of the Bratislava meeting of 27 leaders next week. We decided to organise this informal meeting to discuss and to assess the political consequences of Brexit for the EU community. This doesn’t mean that we are going to discuss our future relations with the UK in Bratislava. For this, and especially for the start of the negotiations, we need your formal notification, I mean Article 50. And this is the position shared by all 27 Member States.
“To put it simply, the ball is now in your court. I am aware that it is not easy, but I still hope you will be ready to start the process as soon as possible. But I am convinced that at the end of the day our common strategy goal will be to establish the best possible relations between the UK and the European Union.”
The position was already well settled: there was unity, and there would be no negotiation without notification. In the background, the European Commission and the European Council were in advanced preparation for the next stage of the Article 50 process. Even the European Parliament, on 8 September, had appointed Guy Verhofstadt as a representative and co-ordinator for the Article 50 process.
The EU stance in terms of both substance and process was solidifying: the train and the track were almost in place. And this was a month before Mrs May’s speech to the Conservative party conference in Birmingham in October.
(continued)
Of Bratislava and Birmingham
The cities of Bratislava and Birmingham do not perhaps have a great deal in common. But in the autumn of 2016 they were the venues for the exposition of markedly different, though complementary, political visions.
Bratislava hosted the second meeting of the EU27. What happened there was critical for the development of the EU’s position on Brexit and beyond. Not only was unity of the 27 member states maintained, but the European Council sought to set up a positive plan for the future. In this respect it is interesting to trace through Mr Tusk’s remarks before and after the summit. Before the summit:
“We haven’t come to Bratislava to comfort each other. Or even worse, to deny the real challenges we face. In this particular moment in the history of our community, after the vote in the UK, the only thing that makes sense is to have a sober and brutally honest assessment of the situation.
“What we need today is an optimistic scenario for the future, no doubts. But it requires a realistic diagnosis of the causes of Brexit, and its political consequences for all Europe. One thing must be absolutely clear here in Bratislava: that we can’t start our discussions tomorrow with this.”
After the summit:
“Our assessment is sober but not defeatist. While we all agree that the European Union is not perfect, we also agree that it is the best instrument we have. That is why we are determined to correct the past mistakes and move on with common solutions as the EU of 27. We will not continue business as usual. To move the EU forward we have discussed a Bratislava roadmap, which sets out the objectives for our work ahead of the Rome meeting in March next year, when we want to conclude this process.”
Part of this is, of course, waffle. But what was significant was that the unity of the EU27 was in respect not only of something negative (the UK leaving the EU) but also of something positive. The resulting “Bratislava roadmap” can also be be taken with a degree of doubt (as should any document called a roadmap rather than an actual map). The exercise, however, was useful in binding the 27 together. The UK may be leaving the EU but this was to be no more than a distraction and was not to become contagious.
By 1 March 2017, the Bratislava declaration had been joined by a European Commission white paper on the “Future of Europe”. Again, there is verbiage and vagueness, but the paper is not insubstantial. And it shows the EU adopting a twin-track approach to Brexit: dealing with the divorce and moving on. The emphasis on the latter means unity on the former is more likely to be maintained.
In Birmingham, weeks after the Bratislava summit, Mrs May announced that the Article 50 notification was to be sent by the end of March 2017. But the bulk of her speech reads well as a reply to Bratislava, a vision of a “global Britain” thriving outside the EU that complements and is consistent with whatever the EU would want to do for itself. But the two visions required complete separation of the EU and UK.
Mrs May also made a virtue of the UK not revealing its detailed Brexit position:
“But we will not be able to give a running commentary or a blow-by-blow account of the negotiations. Because we all know that isn’t how they work. But history is littered with negotiations that failed when the interlocutors predicted the outcome in detail and in advance.”
By then, the EU had set out its own position (which it has stuck to ever since). When Mrs May eventually accepted the logic of her position in January 2017 in her Lancaster House speech (that the UK would leave the single market and customs union), it was some six months after the EU had in effect settled its priorities and objectives.
Many think that the Birmingham speech was the moment the prospect of a “soft Brexit” fell away. Until then, it seems to some, it was still a plausible objective. But by October there was little option for the UK but to accept it was destined for a “hard Brexit” — the EU27′s unity and insistence on the four freedoms and refusal to have exploratory negotiations before notification did not give Britain much choice.
Two weeks after Mrs May’s conference speech, Mr Tusk gave a major speech to the European Policy Centre. Most of this is about the direction of EU27 after Brexit, and repays reading. Only the final paragraphs are dedicated to the UK’s departure, and mention what cannot be compromised:
“As for the negotiations, the situation is pretty clear. Its framework will be set out by the European Council – that is by the guidelines foreseen in the Treaty. Our task will be to protect the interests of the EU as a whole and the interests of each of the 27 member states. And also to stick unconditionally to the Treaty rules and fundamental values. By this I mean, inter alia, the conditions for access to the single market with all four freedoms. There will be no compromises in this regard.
Mr Tusk then emphasises that Brexit means Brexit, and it will be a hard one:
“When it comes to the essence of Brexit, it was largely defined in the UK during the referendum campaign. We all remember the promises, which cumulated in the demand to “take back control”. Namely the “liberation” from European jurisdiction, a “no” to the freedom of movement or further contributions to the EU budget. This approach has definitive consequences, both for the position of the UK government and for the whole process of negotiations. Regardless of magic spells, this means a de facto will to radically loosen relations with the EU, something that goes by the name of “hard Brexit”.
Of Bratislava and Birmingham
The cities of Bratislava and Birmingham do not perhaps have a great deal in common. But in the autumn of 2016 they were the venues for the exposition of markedly different, though complementary, political visions.
Bratislava hosted the second meeting of the EU27. What happened there was critical for the development of the EU’s position on Brexit and beyond. Not only was unity of the 27 member states maintained, but the European Council sought to set up a positive plan for the future. In this respect it is interesting to trace through Mr Tusk’s remarks before and after the summit. Before the summit:
“We haven’t come to Bratislava to comfort each other. Or even worse, to deny the real challenges we face. In this particular moment in the history of our community, after the vote in the UK, the only thing that makes sense is to have a sober and brutally honest assessment of the situation.
“What we need today is an optimistic scenario for the future, no doubts. But it requires a realistic diagnosis of the causes of Brexit, and its political consequences for all Europe. One thing must be absolutely clear here in Bratislava: that we can’t start our discussions tomorrow with this.”
After the summit:
“Our assessment is sober but not defeatist. While we all agree that the European Union is not perfect, we also agree that it is the best instrument we have. That is why we are determined to correct the past mistakes and move on with common solutions as the EU of 27. We will not continue business as usual. To move the EU forward we have discussed a Bratislava roadmap, which sets out the objectives for our work ahead of the Rome meeting in March next year, when we want to conclude this process.”
Part of this is, of course, waffle. But what was significant was that the unity of the EU27 was in respect not only of something negative (the UK leaving the EU) but also of something positive. The resulting “Bratislava roadmap” can also be be taken with a degree of doubt (as should any document called a roadmap rather than an actual map). The exercise, however, was useful in binding the 27 together. The UK may be leaving the EU but this was to be no more than a distraction and was not to become contagious.
By 1 March 2017, the Bratislava declaration had been joined by a European Commission white paper on the “Future of Europe”. Again, there is verbiage and vagueness, but the paper is not insubstantial. And it shows the EU adopting a twin-track approach to Brexit: dealing with the divorce and moving on. The emphasis on the latter means unity on the former is more likely to be maintained.
In Birmingham, weeks after the Bratislava summit, Mrs May announced that the Article 50 notification was to be sent by the end of March 2017. But the bulk of her speech reads well as a reply to Bratislava, a vision of a “global Britain” thriving outside the EU that complements and is consistent with whatever the EU would want to do for itself. But the two visions required complete separation of the EU and UK.
Mrs May also made a virtue of the UK not revealing its detailed Brexit position:
“But we will not be able to give a running commentary or a blow-by-blow account of the negotiations. Because we all know that isn’t how they work. But history is littered with negotiations that failed when the interlocutors predicted the outcome in detail and in advance.”
By then, the EU had set out its own position (which it has stuck to ever since). When Mrs May eventually accepted the logic of her position in January 2017 in her Lancaster House speech (that the UK would leave the single market and customs union), it was some six months after the EU had in effect settled its priorities and objectives.
Many think that the Birmingham speech was the moment the prospect of a “soft Brexit” fell away. Until then, it seems to some, it was still a plausible objective. But by October there was little option for the UK but to accept it was destined for a “hard Brexit” — the EU27′s unity and insistence on the four freedoms and refusal to have exploratory negotiations before notification did not give Britain much choice.
Two weeks after Mrs May’s conference speech, Mr Tusk gave a major speech to the European Policy Centre. Most of this is about the direction of EU27 after Brexit, and repays reading. Only the final paragraphs are dedicated to the UK’s departure, and mention what cannot be compromised:
“As for the negotiations, the situation is pretty clear. Its framework will be set out by the European Council – that is by the guidelines foreseen in the Treaty. Our task will be to protect the interests of the EU as a whole and the interests of each of the 27 member states. And also to stick unconditionally to the Treaty rules and fundamental values. By this I mean, inter alia, the conditions for access to the single market with all four freedoms. There will be no compromises in this regard.
Mr Tusk then emphasises that Brexit means Brexit, and it will be a hard one:
“When it comes to the essence of Brexit, it was largely defined in the UK during the referendum campaign. We all remember the promises, which cumulated in the demand to “take back control”. Namely the “liberation” from European jurisdiction, a “no” to the freedom of movement or further contributions to the EU budget. This approach has definitive consequences, both for the position of the UK government and for the whole process of negotiations. Regardless of magic spells, this means a de facto will to radically loosen relations with the EU, something that goes by the name of “hard Brexit”.
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(continued)
He explains what this means in practice:
“This scenario will in the first instance be painful for Britons. In fact, the words uttered by one of the leading campaigners for Brexit and proponents of the “cake philosophy” was pure illusion: that one can have the EU cake and eat it too. To all who believe in it, I propose a simple experiment. Buy a cake, eat it, and see if it is still there on the plate.
“The brutal truth is that Brexit will be a loss for all of us. There will be no cakes on the table. For anyone. There will be only salt and vinegar. If you ask me if there is any alternative to this bad scenario, I would like to tell you that yes, there is. And I think it is useless to speculate about “soft Brexit” because of all the reasons I’ve mentioned. These would be purely theoretical speculations. In my opinion, the only real alternative to a “hard Brexit” is “no Brexit”. Even if today hardly anyone believes in such a possibility.”
And he sets out what he sees as the realistic outcome:
“We will conduct the negotiations in good faith, defend the interests of the EU 27, minimise the costs and seek the best possible deal for all. But as I have said before, I am afraid that no such outcome exists that will benefit either side. Of course it is and can only be for the UK to assess the outcome of the negotiations and determine if Brexit is really in their interest. Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt’s words: “a full understanding of all the consequences of the political process is the only way to reverse the irreversible flow of history”.”
The EU’s position was clear.
What “orderly” meant
By December 2016, the EU was already advanced in its preparations for Brexit. And what was meant by Brexit being “orderly” was now becoming apparent. This did not only mean that, as a matter of sequence, exit negotiations would precede any agreement on the future trade relationship. “Orderly” also meant the UK paying money to the EU to straighten its affairs before departure: it meant cash, and a lot of it. Already there were reports that Mr Barnier was mentioning the figure of €60bn.
TF50 had worked hard. When Mr Barnier spoke to journalists on 6 December 2016, he was confident enough to say “the EU is ready to receive notification”. He also set out the four principles of the negotiation (which were now, from the EU side, well settled):
“First, unity. Unity is the strength of the European Union and President Juncker and I are determined to preserve the unity and the interest of the EU27 in the Brexit negotiations. This determination is shared by all governments.
“Second, being a Member of the European Union comes with rights and benefits. Third countries can never have the same rights and benefits, since they are not subject to the same obligations.
“Third, negotiations will not start before notification.
“Fourth, the Single Market and its four freedoms are indivisible. Cherry picking is not an option.”
Still in December, eleven days after Mr Barnier’s press briefing, the European Council and EU27 had their third “informal meeting” and prescribed the detailed process to be followed once the Article 50 notification was made.
The European Council even produced an “infographic” of the process to be followed. (You will be charmed by what is used for the “x” in “Brexit”.)
Almost everything was in place for Brexit, and the EU now just waited for the notification. The only big thing left to do was the final preparation of the guidelines (and there was also to be a European parliament resolution).
And 2016 had not even ended.
David Allen Green is law and policy commentator for the FT. His forthcoming book ‘Brexit: What Everyone Needs to Know’ will be published in October by Oxford University Press"
https://www.ft.com/content/e8f67ffb-0092-3833-a792-bd00e049b454
He explains what this means in practice:
“This scenario will in the first instance be painful for Britons. In fact, the words uttered by one of the leading campaigners for Brexit and proponents of the “cake philosophy” was pure illusion: that one can have the EU cake and eat it too. To all who believe in it, I propose a simple experiment. Buy a cake, eat it, and see if it is still there on the plate.
“The brutal truth is that Brexit will be a loss for all of us. There will be no cakes on the table. For anyone. There will be only salt and vinegar. If you ask me if there is any alternative to this bad scenario, I would like to tell you that yes, there is. And I think it is useless to speculate about “soft Brexit” because of all the reasons I’ve mentioned. These would be purely theoretical speculations. In my opinion, the only real alternative to a “hard Brexit” is “no Brexit”. Even if today hardly anyone believes in such a possibility.”
And he sets out what he sees as the realistic outcome:
“We will conduct the negotiations in good faith, defend the interests of the EU 27, minimise the costs and seek the best possible deal for all. But as I have said before, I am afraid that no such outcome exists that will benefit either side. Of course it is and can only be for the UK to assess the outcome of the negotiations and determine if Brexit is really in their interest. Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt’s words: “a full understanding of all the consequences of the political process is the only way to reverse the irreversible flow of history”.”
The EU’s position was clear.
What “orderly” meant
By December 2016, the EU was already advanced in its preparations for Brexit. And what was meant by Brexit being “orderly” was now becoming apparent. This did not only mean that, as a matter of sequence, exit negotiations would precede any agreement on the future trade relationship. “Orderly” also meant the UK paying money to the EU to straighten its affairs before departure: it meant cash, and a lot of it. Already there were reports that Mr Barnier was mentioning the figure of €60bn.
TF50 had worked hard. When Mr Barnier spoke to journalists on 6 December 2016, he was confident enough to say “the EU is ready to receive notification”. He also set out the four principles of the negotiation (which were now, from the EU side, well settled):
“First, unity. Unity is the strength of the European Union and President Juncker and I are determined to preserve the unity and the interest of the EU27 in the Brexit negotiations. This determination is shared by all governments.
“Second, being a Member of the European Union comes with rights and benefits. Third countries can never have the same rights and benefits, since they are not subject to the same obligations.
“Third, negotiations will not start before notification.
“Fourth, the Single Market and its four freedoms are indivisible. Cherry picking is not an option.”
Still in December, eleven days after Mr Barnier’s press briefing, the European Council and EU27 had their third “informal meeting” and prescribed the detailed process to be followed once the Article 50 notification was made.
The European Council even produced an “infographic” of the process to be followed. (You will be charmed by what is used for the “x” in “Brexit”.)
Almost everything was in place for Brexit, and the EU now just waited for the notification. The only big thing left to do was the final preparation of the guidelines (and there was also to be a European parliament resolution).
And 2016 had not even ended.
David Allen Green is law and policy commentator for the FT. His forthcoming book ‘Brexit: What Everyone Needs to Know’ will be published in October by Oxford University Press"
https://www.ft.com/content/e8f67ffb-0092-3833-a792-bd00e049b454
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You do not seriously expect him to be able to read it, do you?
His attention span will not get him past the first sentence.
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Ahh so , what you're saying is. it's only illegal to deport EU criminals from our shores when the EU tells us it's illegal. Next you'll be telling me Sovereignty wasn't one of the issues with the referendum.
Seems to me we're not allowed to deport EU criminals because the bloody EU don't want them back.
You don't know what the EU strategy is do youJohnD
****.
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Told you.
abuse when your BS falls apart
you have not got a scooby have you
I know what they want and I do not need to google it or desperately seek the info of the web
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If you sign up to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), you have to respect their decisions or, if you do not, wait until you have removed your signature.
Obviously the then Home Secreytary was not aware of that. TM's wrong decision again!
Pleased to see my Brexit-protection investment is doing well.
https://markets.ft.com/data/investment-trust/tearsheet/summary?s=FEV:LSE
https://markets.ft.com/data/investment-trust/tearsheet/summary?s=FEV:LSE
Oh dear u do have a problem don't you JohnD u cannot answer the question
Tell me what the EU want for there nationals living in the UK ??
I know
Adopt plan B JohnD when all else fails, start name calling /abuse
u cannot answer the questionTell me what the EU want for there nationals living in the UK ??
I know
Adopt plan B JohnD when all else fails, start name calling /abuse
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