AMD 3 and "non-combustible" CUs...

I would be very reluctant to squirt a fire extinguisher into or above a DB unless I knew with absolute certainty that the supply had already been isolated upstream, and I had been given some kind of training.

It looks to me like the top of the DB was close to the ceiling, so the fire could easily pass into the void, with dry timber and hundreds of year's worth of dust and rats nests. A 24 (72)-way DB is quite tall.

By the time he saw it, I think it was time to "get out and stay out" though the report says some wise person isolated the supply in the plant room before leaving. That db has the larger style of main switch which IIRC is 250A-rated
 
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The fire officer's report was essentially intended to identify "cause" (electrical fault). Whilst it made very interesting reading, and I am certainly not qualified to critique the report, I would suggest it may have misidentified the root or primary failure causation.

The report states :
6.3. The forensic examination of the distribution board shows evidence that there has been resistive heating on the connection between the two lower left hand side neutral bars that serve fuses numbered one to thirty six.
6.4. The affected connection was found to be considerably tighter than others on the same component and in comparison with those on the right hand neutral bar which serve fuses thirty seven to seventy two. This over tightening has caused a deformation of the wiring and over time caused the connection to loosen hence increasing the resistance of the wiring and subsequently the generation of considerable heat. This heating process has degraded the connection, including its insulation, continuously until full combustion (in the form of open flame) has occurred.

The report suggests that an overtightening caused failure of the connection. Unless such overtightening actually fractured wire strands then I fail to understand such a mechanism of failure.

Studying photographs DSC-0042 and DSC-0047 it is evident that the screws used to secure the main inter-connectors are "allen" screws whereas those the screws used to connect the outgoing load wiring uses "phillips" (or "pozidrive") screws. It is therefore to be expected that the failure point (allen screw) on the inter-connector would be "considerably tighter" than others (phillips) on the "same component". Further, thermal damage (melting) of the brass connector bar would possibly cause physical interference or fusion (brazing) onto the steel clamp screw and hence make it appear to be excessively tight.

Close examination of DSC-0047 clearly indicates a crack in the brass forming that part of the bar into which the inter-connector is clamped. This was mentioned by AL66, and is possibly the result of physical weakness of the bar due to the relatively thin wall thickness at the end of the brass bar. It is unlikely to have been caused by heat since this would simply have softened the brass and permitted plastic deformation. I would contend that the fracture either occurred during panel assembly (tightening of the inter-connector clamp screw) or at some later date, it not being unknown for brass under stress to fail at some later date - a phenomenon I've personally experienced.

Too often, in incident investigation, the need to identify cause fails to get to the root cause. In this case I submit that 'electrical fault' was a secondary cause of the incident and that the root cause is questionable design or assembly of the neutral connector bar. Unless, of course, the panel manufacturer specified inter-connector torque screw limitations which were then exceeded by the panel assembler.
 
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The report suggests that am overtightening caused failure of the connection. Unless such overtightening actually fractured wire strands then I fail to understand such a mechanism of failure.
I don't think you're the only one to fail to understand that alleged mechanism of failure ...
Interesting! Does this mean that we should leave all connections loose, so that they can tighten up over time and thus be safer? :)

Kind Regards, John
 
The report suggests that am overtightening caused failure of the connection. Unless such overtightening actually fractured wire strands then I fail to understand such a mechanism of failure.
I don't think you're the only one to fail to understand that alleged mechanism of failure ...
I think the suggestion is that overtightening caused the crack that is visible in DSC-047, which allowed the brass busbar to deform away from the conductor, thus reducing the pressure and causing heating.
I'm not sure why the interconnector shown in the same picture appears to have the indent of a screw in it, whereas the hole in the terminal still appears full of copper.
Maybe we'll be able to find higher-resolution photos after any court cases have concluded.
 
I think the suggestion is that overtightening caused the crack that is visible in DSC-047, which allowed the brass busbar to deform away from the conductor, thus reducing the pressure and causing heating.
Indeed - that's been suggested before (by you?) and may well be the case. If that is what is meant, the author of the report might benefit from education in clarity of writing!

Kind Regards, John
 
T'wasn't me that said it!
No, on looking back, it wasn't you who said it (or something very similar) first. It was ...
... Has photos of the DB pre fire, also the the problem neutral connection - looks to me like it might have been tightened to the point that the brass connection bar fractured on one side resulting in a loose connection.

Kind Regards, John
 
Bring the Wylex standard boards back (With RCD's added), their inherently extra secure terminals will eliminate much risk.
 
Bring the Wylex standard boards back (With RCD's added), their inherently extra secure terminals will eliminate much risk.
Taking the whole range of possible hazards into account, I wouldn't be surprised to find that a 'good solid wood' CU (engineered as well as the Wylex Standards were - plus, as you say, RCDs etc.) was actually, on balance, the 'safest' in a domestic environment!

Kind Regards, John
 
Something else that might be considered :
If the systems supplied by the distribution-board were mainly single phase (line & neutral) loads and if the phase loading was unbalanced (more loads on one phase than the other two then a possible over-voltage scenario could have been experienced by some of the service devices.
For example : Say red phase was heavily loaded with respect to yellow and blue and its neutral connections were predominately that of the defective bar, then when the neutral bar disconnected due to the inter-connector failure, the 'floating' neutral bar voltage could have risen to near that of the red phase. This would mean that any devices fed by the red phase would lose voltage but any devices fed from yellow or blue phases also connected to this same neutral bar would now experience an increase in voltage from the nominal 230v to potentially 400v.

Many domestic devices now use switch-mode power supplies that operate between 90 and 240volts.
400v or so may well have been sufficient to possibly cause these to become secondary sources of fire.
 
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