No, you communicate clearly, but if i were to be critical, you could try to be a little more concise
I'm certainly not known for my brevity. However, that's not because I can't be concise - it's because if I
am concise, then some annoying person invariably picks me up on some detail or caveat and I could have included, but omitted in the interests of brevity!!
I agree that just asking people here will not give un-deniable proof either way, but they are permitted by the regs and presumably have undergone some testing by a collection of white coated bods in some way connected to the IET. The regs even go a little further by conditioning the crimp types that can and cannot be used on different cable types. I think it says something like 'can be used on all cable types unless marked with.......(from memory as my book is on the job at the mo, maybe someone can fill in the blanks here)
What regs are you talking about? The real problem underlying this whole issue is that BS7671 says virtually nothing - simply a few words in one place about a joint made with a "suitable (or is it 'appropriate') compression tool". If it was a bit more specific about what was acceptable, then maybe a lot of this discussion would be unnecessary.
In terms of 13 not being warm, then zero is positively chilly. Have you seen anything like air crash investigators on some Natgeo? There are teams specifically tasked with looking at reasons for catastrophic failure. So ill revise my total guess to 297.
Yes, I've seen many of those programmes, and I actually know a couple of air crash investigators, but I don't get your point. Crashes and crash investigators only come into the picture when the risk-assessment and risk-prevention measures have failed. Maybe you misunderstood or misread the question I asked (to which you have given answers of 13 and 297
) For a start, it was essentially a rhetorical question, but what it was asking (or trying to ask) is how many people have seen most of the
theoretically possible failures which are considered and addressed by design and/or regulations as part of the risk-minimising design/regulation processes. The vast majority of those 'theoretical possible failures' are things which have never happened in the past (hence answer=zero) and will hopefully never happen in the future - but in many cases that is precisely
because the possibility was considered and steps taken to minimise the risk of their occurring. I'm sure you really understand all this - it's at the basis of risk assessment, risk management and risk minimisation, in very many fields.
Kind Regards, John.