alarm call for all

[dpt]

So ignorant. Have a wander around the New Forest Estate a huuuge newbuild estate and then report back how many yale alarms you see.

A person who punts out budget DIY systems in an area with high crime, unemployment and drug related activity is beyond ignorant.

You are the Joke Dpt...

You claim to be concerned for peoples safety and then can't wait indeed trip over yourself with links to jamming devices and detailed instructions on how to use them.

Really? I have been reserved on the amount of information I post, this is the difficulty when constantly asked , by you, how do you get around this etc I don't see any detailed instructions.

I could have gone into more detail. For instance, 75/90% of manufactured alarms are Honeywell hardware/software with a whole range of vulnerabilities, hard wired and wireless. Encryption algorithms you ask about for instance are over 20 years out of date, a 7 year old could crack it

Let's look at the sensor information that's transmits UNENCRYPTED! Serial number, loop information and check scum info Ever heard of "spoofing" sensors?

Informed is what I like to be and I'm sure everyone else would also

I will finish this later.

You just don't get what a plonker you are do you?

Me a plonker? I fully inform my customers, it's the honest thing to do

 

[alumni]

Have you been to Middleton? I can tell you that there is an amateur friend of mine living up the hill. Most houses are boarded up and it's a virtual no go area for the law. I can honestly say I have not seen a yale alarm.

The jammer comment is a joke right?

Now look what you've started.
Got him on his self promoting donkey again regarding his favourite location.

Yes there are some Yale toot boxes on the walls there. But the number of which are far outweighed by systems installed by other companies using better branded product.

 

[JohnD]

All this hypothetical speculation is doubtless great fun.

But is there some practical experience of burglaries to back it up?

The offer is still open...

OK, I love truth and evidence, so I've got another £5 here for the first person to provide good evidence. It'll be worth it.

Have you ever known someone use such a device to help them burgle an ordinary domestic house?

Have you evidence of a UK burglar being charged for "going equipped" with such a device?

This offer expires 30th May.

 

[alan333]

Tataylor1- Is it just me or has this thread transformed somewhat since your original questions?

 

[tataylor1]

Tataylor1- Is it just me or has this thread transformed somewhat since your original questions?

ha! the thread is now more of a ball of wool it seems.

Maybe if we keep going it will transform into a balaclava of some kind and then if my alarm does get bypassed I might at least be able to sell it to the burglar on his way out.

Some posts have been very useful though so thanks all

 

[dpt]

Tataylor1- Is it just me or has this thread transformed somewhat since your original questions?

ha! the thread is now more of a ball of wool it seems.

Maybe if we keep going it will transform into a balaclava of some kind and then if my alarm does get bypassed I might at least be able to sell it to the burglar on his way out.

Some posts have been very useful though so thanks all

You might find this interesting?

"Alarm systems and panels were designed before the prevalence of wireless technology and communicate with a proprietary protocol over a two-wire data bus. This bus was designed for use between alarm panels, keypads and zone expanders. However this has now been extended to allow the system to communicate with wireless sensors. Unfortunately, little research has been performed regarding these systems, and operational information about them is scarce and often incorrect. This presentation will demonstrate several classic vulnerabilities of alarm installations and then present several new techniques for reducing the effectiveness of the alarm system.

Babak Javadi / Keith Howell"

------------

 

[bernardgreen]

I hadn't realised the key pads sent the user's PIN over a wireless link as an un-encrypted packet.

But that would require a sophisticated criminal to clone that. Possibly the reason for using rolling codes on newer systems to protect against cloning.

 

[alumni]

I hadn't realised the key pads sent the user's PIN over a wireless link as an un-encrypted packet.

But that would require a sophisticated criminal to clone that. Possibly the reason for using rolling codes on newer systems to protect against cloning.

There's a blog running at the moment that covers all these issues.
Check your pm

 

[Europlex]

Oh, roll on the 30th May

 

[alumni]

Oh, roll on the 30th May

At least his mates are still responding to him in here.

 

[JohnD]

I hadn't realised the key pads sent the user's PIN over a wireless link as an un-encrypted packet.

I notice that the RF interface structure and the installation learning process he describes is different from the Yale one.

also (I just checked) the technique he describes at 27:13 does not work on my Galaxy (Honeywell) system, and the 4-digit fixed length PIN hes describes at 26:41 is not correct

 

[dpt]

I hadn't realised the key pads sent the user's PIN over a wireless link as an un-encrypted packet.

But that would require a sophisticated criminal to clone that. Possibly the reason for using rolling codes on newer systems to protect against cloning.

There's a blog running at the moment that covers all these issues.
Check your pm

I didn't get that PM

 

[dpt]

I hadn't realised the key pads sent the user's PIN over a wireless link as an un-encrypted packet.

I notice that the RF interface structure and the installation learning process he describes is different from the Yale one.

also (I just checked) the technique he describes at 27:13 does not work on my Galaxy (Honeywell) system, and the 4-digit fixed length PIN hes describes at 26:41 is not correct

These guys are the best in the world chap

 

[JohnD]

so I must have misunderstood when he says it works on any Honeywell system you mean?

try it on yours.

 

[bernardgreen]

I notice that the RF interface structure and the installation learning process he describes is different from the Yale one.

Different as in better ?

also (I just checked) the technique he describes at 27:13 does not work on my Galaxy (Honeywell) system, and the 4-digit fixed length PIN hes describes at 26:41 is not correct

I am surprised, why do you have a Honeywell when the Yale is, in your opinion, a reliable and effective system and best value.